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Abstract
Background: Impulsivity is a hallmark of problem gambling. However, impulsivity is not a unitary construct and this study
investigated the relationship between problem gambling severity and two facets of impulsivity: impulsive action (impaired
ability to withhold a motor response) and impulsive choice (abnormal aversion for the delay of reward).
Methods: The recruitment includes 65 problem gamblers and 35 normal control participants. On the basis of DSM-IV-TR
criteria, two groups of gamblers were distinguished: problem gamblers (n = 38) and pathological gamblers (n = 27) with
similar durations of gambling practice. Impulsive action was assessed using a response inhibition task (the stop-signal task).
Impulsive choice was estimated with the delay-discounting task. Possible confounds (e.g., IQ, mood, ADHD symptoms) were
recorded.
Results: Both problem and pathological gamblers discounted reward at a higher rate than their controls, but only
pathological gamblers showed abnormally low performance on the most demanding condition of the stop-signal task.
None of the potential confounds covaried with these results.
Conclusions: These results suggest that, whereas abnormal impulsive choice characterizes all problem gamblers,
pathological gamblers’ impairments in impulsive action may represent an important developmental pathway of
pathological gambling.
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Introduction
For many people, gambling represents an occasional and
recreational activity (e.g., usual lottery players). However, for some
people it may become detrimental and evolve in an addiction that
is a burden (e.g., work, family and financial problems). Once
addicted, gamblers persist in playing for many ‘‘good’’ overt and
covert reasons. However, like in other addictions, negative
consequences directly associated with gambling seem to be weak
regulators of these behaviors.
As one possible explanation, addiction to gambling may be due
to poor control of impulses [1]. For instance, poor inhibition of
prepotent responses in adult outpatient pathological gamblers may
contribute to pathological gambler’s weak capacity to remain
abstinent 1 year after being enrolled in cognitive behavioral
treatment for their pathological gambling problem [2]. Dimin-
ished self-regulation is reflected in the inability to inhibit the salient
response associated with gambling, either cognitively (e.g., positive
expectations to gamble), emotionally (e.g., sadness, excitement), or
behaviorally (e.g., keep gambling). Highlighting the importance of
poor self-regulatory processes in the maintenance of abnormal
gambling behaviors is consistent with modern theoretical propos-
als of loss of willpower in addiction [3,4]. According to these
authors, a state of addiction reflects an imbalance between
sensitized automatic cognitive processes (e.g., memory bias for
automatic activation of gambling-related associations, attentional
biases for gambling cues) [5,6] and hampered capacities of self-
control (e.g., suppressing the prepotent response, resisting inter-
ference) [7]. This imbalance between strong automatic processes
making gambling very ‘wanted’ and weak cognitive processes
unable regulating them, could reflect a state of impulsivity.
In this view, ‘‘impulsivity’’ is an umbrella concept encompassing
a great number of automatic (e.g., reward processing) and
intentional mechanisms (e.g., effortful inhibition) [8]. In the
present study, we focused on the distinction between two
behavioral expressions of impulsivity; impulsive action and impulsive
choice [9–11]. Impulsive action refers to the inability to withhold a
response and thereby reflecting poor response inhibition. Other
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behaviors do not result from response inhibition deficits but reflect
impulsive choice, that is, an abnormal level of delay aversion as
exemplified by increased preference for immediate reward over
more beneficial but delayed reward. This distinction has been
justified by behavioral and neurobiological evidence supporting
distinct cortico-striatal substrates [11]. For instance, impulsive action
reflects a disorder of dysregulation of action associated with
diminished inhibitory control, whereas impulsive choice could be a
motivational style (delay aversion) associated with fundamental
alterations in reward mechanisms [12]. Moreover, neither in rats
nor humans was impulsive action related to impulsive choice [13].
Interestingly, both dimensions of impulsivity are associated with
pathological gambling but their respective influences on facets of
pathological gambling is not clear yet [14]. Thus, pathological
gamblers (1) exhibit impaired response inhibition performance
(i.e., increased action impulsivity) [7,15–18] and (2) show a
preference for small, immediately available rewards over a variety
of larger but delayed rewards, including long term financial health
(i.e., increased choice impulsivity) [19].
Impulsive action could be indexed by stop-signal [20,21] and
go/no-go tasks [22], which require the subject to withhold simple
motor responses when a stop-signal occurs (stop-signal task) or
when a no-go stimulus is presented (go/no-go task). Impulsive
choice could be assessed through the delay discounting task (DDT)
[23]. In a typical delay discounting procedure, participants are
asked to make a series of choices between large rewards (e.g.
$1000) delayed by various delay intervals (e.g. 6 h to 25 years) and
smaller immediate rewards (e.g. $1–$999). At each delay, the
magnitude of the small immediate reward is adjusted until the
small immediate and large delayed rewards are subjectively
equivalent in value, referred to as the indifference point.
However, despite the accumulating evidence supporting the
view that impulsivity is not a unitary construct, to the best of our
knowledge there is no data available on within-subject compar-
isons of various aspects of impulsivity in problem or pathological
gambling. This within-subject approach is particularly suited to
examine whether the multidimensional nature of impulsivity may
help to discriminate gamblers varying in their degree of problem
gambling severity. For instance, in nicotine dependence, initial
level of nicotine self-administration is primarily associated with
impulsive action whereas impulsive choice seems to be related to
the persistence of nicotine seeking during abstinence together with
an enhanced sensitivity to nicotine-associated cues in both humans
[24] and rats [25]. Hence, these later findings indicate that the
involvement of impulsive action and impulsive choice may vary
across different stages or clinical manifestations of nicotine
dependence. Despite the advantages of within-subject compari-
sons, association between problem gambling severity and impul-
sivity has been conducted in separate groups each performing
impulsivity paradigms targeting impulsive action or impulsive
choice independently. These studies demonstrated that problem
gambling is positively associated with impulsive action [18] and
impulsive choice [26,27], but see [28]. However, because of major
differences in the sample characteristics of these studies (i.e.,
duration of gambling practice, evaluation of gambling dependence
severity, age, gender, depression, anxiety, psychiatric comorbid-
ities), direct comparisons should be taken with caution. Hence, the
current literature does not answer the question of which type of
impulsivity (i.e., of action, of choice) characterizes individuals with
problematic or pathological gambling, which is the aim of the
present study.
Therefore, the aim of this study was to investigate the
relationship between the severity of gambling dependence and
two facets of impulsive control (i.e., impulsive action and impulsive
choice) in a same study design. Severe pathological gamblers, at-
risk gamblers, and non-gamblers were compared according to
their cognitive self-regulation efficiency. Our hypotheses were (1)
that pathological gamblers (PG) show more pronounced impulsive
action and impulsive choice than problem gamblers (PrG), who
would be more impulsive than non-gamblers, (2) that higher




The ethical review board of the Brugmann Hospital approved
the study and written informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
Participants and recruitment
Sixty-five gamblers and thirty-five non-gamblers participated in
the study. Gamblers were recruited trough advertisement from the
casino complex VIAGE, Brussels, Belgium. The ads asked for
participants who ‘‘gambled frequently’’ to participate in a one-day
study to explore factors associated with gambling. A telephone-
screening interview was conducted by means of a locally
developed screening tool, which included an examination of
frequency of gambling behavior and comorbid psychiatric
disorders. We excluded any subject who a) reported gambling in
casino settings less than once a week or less than four times a
month during the past 18 months, b) was older than 65 years (in
order to avoid potential confounding from slow motor functioning
due to aging), c) had experienced a substance use disorder during
the year before enrollment into the study. In addition, participants
were judged to be medically healthy on the basis of the results of
their medical history. Substance use and medical history were
examined on the basis of items taken from the Addiction Severity
Index Short Form. The flow of gamblers through the study is
presented in Figure 1.
Pathological gambling was assessed on the basis of the DSM-IV-
TR. A total of 27 participating gamblers met the DSM-IV criteria
for pathological gambling. Moreover, DSM-IV structured inter-
view indicated that no gambler received therapeutic treatment at
the time of the study. In addition, in order to distinguish frequent
gamblers with a gambling problem from frequent gamblers
without a gambling problem, gambling dependence severity was
assessed using the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) [29].
Only 6 participants did not meet the criteria for low problem
gambling (SOGS$3). Due to statistical power issues, results of
these 6 participants were not included in the present manuscript.
All remaining gamblers (N = 65) met the criteria for low problem
gambling, and 33 of those (51%) met the criteria for probable
pathological gambling on the SOGS (SOGS$5). We observed
that none of the participants who scored 3 or 4 on the SOGS met
the DSM-IV criteria for pathological gambling; 14 (70%) of the 20
respondents who scored 5, 6 or 7 on the SOGS met the DSM-IV
criteria for pathological gambling; all of the 13 respondents who
scored 8 or higher on the SOGS met the DSM-IV criteria for
pathological gambling. Thus, a total of 27 pathological gamblers
(PG) and 38 PrG participants were included in the study.
Participants from the control group were recruited by word of
mouth from the community (e.g., hospital employees). To avoid
biases, resulting from inside knowledge of how these tasks operate,
psychiatrists, psychologists and other personnel with psychological
training were excluded from participation. The three groups were
matched for age, gender, professional and educational level (see
Table 1).
Impulsive Choice and Action in Problem Gambling
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Figure 1. Flow of gamblers through the study.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050647.g001











n 35 38 27
Age (SD) 44.14(11.01) 38.46(15.42) 40.15(10.15) F(2,97) = 1.88, p = .16 CONT = PG = PrG
Male/Female 28/7 28/10 21/6 X2(2,98) = 0.42, p = .81 CONT = PG = PrG
Employed full time % (n) 74.3(26) 71.05(27) 70.37(19) X2(2,98) = 0.14, p = .93 CONT = PrG
Education% (n)
,12th grade 34.3(12) 39.4(15) 40.7(11) X2(2,98) = .33, p = .85 CONT = PrG
12th grade or higher 65.7(23) 60.6(23) 59.3(16)
WAIS VOC 44.61(6.30) 45.60(6.15) 43.29(7.34) F(2, 98) = 0.94, p = .39 CONT = PG = PrG
WAIS BLOC REP 15.51(1.89) 14.40(2.46) 14.18(2.88) F(2, 98) = 1.71, p = .19 CONT = PG = PrG
WAIS BLOC TR 19.30(5.59) 21.24(6.92) 22.66(6.87) F(2, 98) = 1.67, p = .27 CONT = PG = PrG
ADHD 7.61(3.31) 13.58(5.91) 12.52(3.79) F(2, 97) = 15.23, p,.001 CONT,PG, PrG
BDI 2.29(2.47) 6.18(5.10) 10.44(6.02) F(2, 98) = 31.63, p,.001 CONT,PrG,PG
STAI-S 30.29(9.96) 39.24(13.76) 43.78(13.72) F(2, 98) = 8.23, p,.001 CONT,PrG, PG
STAI-T 36.64(7.31) 45.50(9.64) 49.73(9.53) F(2, 98) = 17.76, p,.001 CONT,PrG, PG
SOGS 0.00(0.00) 4.69(2.88) 9.78(3.67) t(65) = 6.39, p,.001 PrG,PG
Duration of gambling practice
(in years)
/ 17.53(12.87) 15.11(11.60) t(65) = .65, p = .51 PrG = PG
Values shown are the mean and standard deviations on each measure. The South Oaks Gambling Screen was administered only in the PG and PrG groups. Degrees of
freedom differ due to missing data. WAIS VOC = WAIS vocabulary, WAIS BLOC REP = WAIS block design correct responses, WAIS BLOC TR = WAIS bloc design reaction
time, ADHD = attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, STAI-S = State version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, STAI-T = Trait version
of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, SOGS = South Oaks Gambling Screen.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050647.t001
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Current clinical status
Current clinical status of depression and anxiety was rated with
the Beck Depression Inventory [30] and the Spielberger State–
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) [31], respectively. Participants also
completed the Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale (ASRS-v1.1) [32].
Intelligence was also estimated. We assessed intelligence with
two subtests of the WAIS, namely the block design and vocabulary
subtests [33]. This short form of the WAIS correlates with the full
scale WAIS IQ in the 0.90 range [34].
Impulsive choice measure: Delay Discounting Task (DDT)
The DDT [23] is a behavioral task that involves presenting
participants a series of possible reward scenarios. The procedure
used matched that of Madden and collaborators [23], who used
the DDT with opiate addicts. Participants were repeatedly asked
the question: ‘‘Would you rather have $X today, or $1000 in Y
time period?’’ The task then systematically varied both the amount
of money offered immediately and the length of time before
receiving the delayed reward, permitting quantitative assessment
of the function an individual uses to discount the reward based on
its delay. Dollar (X) levels used were as follows: $1000, $990, $960,
$940, $920, $850, $800, $750, $700, $650, $600, $550, $500,
$450, $400, $350, $300, $250, $200, $150, $100, $80, $60, $40,
$20, $10, $5, and $1. Time (Y) intervals used were 1 week, 2
weeks, 2 months, 6 months, 1 year, 5 years, and 25 years.
The DDT provides two reciprocal assessments. First, the
individual was asked to choose between $1000 today or $1000
following the first time interval (one week). The immediate choice
dollar value was then successively reduced until the participant
switched their decision from selecting the discounted reward (e.g.,
$900) to the delayed full reward ($1000). Following the switch, the
procedure continued for five additional monetary levels to ensure
this was indeed the lowest point of choice modification. Seven
trials of this procedure were employed, one for each of the time
intervals. Second, following identification of the descending switch
point for all seven-time intervals, the procedure began at the
original time interval (one week) and was conducted in the
opposite direction. That is, in the second part, the task began at
the point five increments below the participant’s switching point
and successively increased the immediate reward until the
individual stopped selecting the delayed reward ($1000) and
returned to accepting the immediate reward. Similarly, the
procedure continued for five additional reward levels beyond the
switch to ensure this point was correctly identified. The dependent
measure was constituted by the ‘‘point of indifference’’ which
consisted of the average, for each time interval, of the descending
and ascending switch points.
Impulsive action measure: GoStop Impulsivity Paradigm
(GoStop)
The GoStop was used to measure response inhibition [20]. In
this task, participants were presented with a consecutive series of
five-digit numbers on a computer screen. On each trial, novel
stimulus (new, previously unseen set of five numbers) was
presented for 500 ms, after which a target stimulus (a set of
numbers always identical to the immediately preceding novel
stimulus; in black font) appeared for 500 ms. Each trial was
separated by a 1500 milliseconds interval. Participants were
instructed to refrain from responding to the novel stimuli, and to
click the mouse when presented with the black target (go) stimulus.
However, on some trials, the black target (go) stimulus turned red
(i.e., a ‘stop’ signal), which indicated that participants had to
withhold their response to the target stimulus as well. Stop signals
were presented 50 ms, 150 ms, 250 ms and 350 ms after the onset
of presentation (stop-signal delays). The task was divided into two
blocks of 80 trials. Participants were given a 30 seconds rest
between the two blocks.
When the stop signal is presented shortly after the target
stimulus, participants can easily withhold their response. As the
delay between the target stimulus and the stop signal increases,
probability of responding typically increases. To account for such
observations, Logan and Cowan [35] proposed the horse race model,
which assumes that two processes race against each other: a go
process, triggered by the presentation of the target stimulus, and a
stop process, triggered by the presentation of the stop signal. If the
stop process finishes before the go process, participants inhibit
their response; if the go process finishes before the stop process,
response inhibition fails and subjects respond. In this study, we
used percentage of inhibited responses (proportion of correctly
inhibited responses to the number of stop signals presented) for
each stop-signal delay (i.e., 50–350 ms) as a measure of response
inhibition [36]. We expected that probability of responding would
be higher in impulsive participants. Note that we did not have
enough observations to reliably estimate the latency of the stop
process [37].
Procedure
This paper is part of a larger study into decision-making
impairments in problem gambling. A paper regarding deficits of
decision-making under uncertainty in problem gamblers was
published elsewhere [38]. The current study focused on distinct
facet of impulsivity in this same group of participants.
An intake interview was first undertaken, which included
screening (in the gambler group: DSM-IV criteria for pathological
gambling; in the control group: substance use and medical history of
controls on the basis of items taken from the Addiction Severity
Index Short Form) and self reports measures (SOGS score, current
clinical status and demographics for all participants). Participants
completed the computer task individually and in a quiet room,
located at the Medical Psychology Laboratory, Brugmann Hospital.
The order of test presentation was counterbalanced. No significant
correlations between administration order and performance were
present. After completion of the tasks, the research assistant
answered any questions the participant had and provided payment.
Participants received J15 for their participation.
Data analysis
Initial data analysis involved assessing differences between
groups on demographic variables (e.g., gender, age) and current
clinical status (depression, anxiety, ADHD, IQ), using parametric
or non-parametric statistics as appropriate.
Delay Discounting and GoStop tasks data were evaluated using
repeated measures ANOVA. The nature of overall group effects
and group by factor interactions was investigated using pairwise
group comparisons investigating differences between pathological
gamblers group (PG) and the control group, the PG group and the
problem gambler (PrG) group, and the PrG group and the control
group.
Results
Demographics and current clinical status
A description of demographic variables, scores on the South
Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS), estimated IQ, Adult ADHD Self-
Report Scale (ASRS-v1.1), Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI) and
the Trait and State version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI) is presented in Table 1. ANOVAs revealed that PG, PrG,
Impulsive Choice and Action in Problem Gambling
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controls were similar in terms of age, educational level, and
estimated IQ (as measured by the Block Design and Vocabulary
subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test). Chi square
analyses revealed no differences in the distribution of male and
female participants. There was also no difference between PG and
PrG on years of gambling use. There was a group difference on
ADHD Rating Scale scores, F(2, 97) = 15.23, p,.001. Group
contrasts revealed that PG and PrG groups scored higher than the
control group (p,.001) on the ADHD Rating Scale. Depression
was higher in PG than in PrG and in PrG compared to controls,
F(2, 98) = 31.63, p,.001; contrasts: p’s,.001. A group effect for
State and Trait Anxiety was found, F(2, 98) = 8.23, p,.001; F(2,
98) = 17.76, p,.001, respectively. State and Trait anxiety were
higher in the PG and in the PrG groups in comparison with the
control group, p’s,.001. No other group differences were present.
We controlled for the potential covariate effect of ADHD,
depression, and trait -state anxiety in subsequent analyses.
Importantly, comparisons between PG, PrG and normal controls
remained statistically significant when potentially confounding
variables (ADHD, depression, trait and state anxiety) were
individually entered as covariate into the statistical model.
Impulsive choice: DDT
Performance in the DDT shows that problem gamblers (PrG)
and pathological gamblers (PG) discounted reward at a higher rate
than control participants (see Figure 2). A repeated measures
ANOVA was performed, with group as a between-subjects factor;
time interval as a within subjects factor; and the point of
indifference as the dependent measure. This analysis revealed an
effect of time interval, F(2, 98) = 153.89, p,.001, g2 = .62, and a
group effect, F(2, 98) = 9.95, p,.001, g2 = .18. Pairwise group
comparisons revealed a significant difference between the PG and
control group, F(1, 62) = 19.78, p,.001, g2 = .24, a significant
difference between the PrG and control participants, F(1,
71) = 13.47, p,.001, g2 = .16, but no significant difference
between the PG and PrG samples, F(1, 64) = 0.62, ns.
Impulsive action: GoStop
Results of the GoStop are presented in Figures 3 and 4.
Probability of inhibition was lower for pathological gamblers than
control subjects or problem gamblers, but only when the stop-
signal delay was long (see Figure 3). A repeated measures ANOVA
was performed, with group as a between-subjects factor; stop-
signal delay as a within subjects factor; and the proportion of
correctly inhibited responses as the dependent measure. This
analysis revealed an effect of latency interval, F(3, 97) = 239.48,
p,.001, g2 = .71, which is consistent with the race model, and a
trend group6 latency interval interaction, F(6, 94) = 1.84, p = .092,
g2 = .04. To explore the interaction, we conducted pairwise group
comparisons for each latency interval conditions. These analyses
revealed that PrG (M = 36.02; SD = 18.79) and normal controls
(M = 34.04; SD = 19.89) performed better than PG (M = 23.62;
SD = 15.84) for SSD = 350 ms, t(64) = 2.86, p,.01; t(62) = 2.19,
p,.05, respectively. There were no differences for the shorter
SSDs.
In addition, we observed no group difference on proportion of
novel stimuli no-respond (PG: M = 98.67; SD = 3.41; PrG:
M = 97.76; SD = 3.25; controls: M = 98.57; SD = 2.49, F(1,
99) = 0.31, ns). We also computed inhibition function plots [for a
complete description of this method, see 37] in order to control for
the possibility that between-groups differences on stop-signal trials
might be due to abnormal reaction time (RT) of PG during the
task. Inhibition functions plot the probability of responding [or in
our case, probability of inhibiting, which is 1-p(respond)] as a
function of stop-signal delay, and have been used frequently to
compare inhibitory control in different groups, tasks or conditions
[37]. However, group differences in probability of stopping could
be caused by differences in reaction times to the target stimuli. We
can account for that by plotting probability of stopping as a
function of mean RT – SSD. If group differences in probabilities
of stopping are indeed due to differences in mean RT, inhibition
functions should become aligned. Thus, to explore the inhibition
deficit in our study, we plotted for each group the proportion of
correctly inhibited responses for (a) stop-signal delays (50; 150;
250; 350); (b) the difference between mean of RT for non-stop
Figure 2. Delay discounting subjective euro amounts and delay periods. PrG = problem gamblers; PG = pathological gamblers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050647.g002
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trials and stop-signal latency intervals. Figure 4 shows that the
misalignment of inhibition function is not modified when RT for
non-stop trials was taken into account. This result suggests that
between-group differences on the proportion of correctly inhibited
responses is related to weak motor response inhibition, and not
differences in mean RT. Recent work also suggests that a
distinction can be made between proactive inhibition when people
anticipate a stop signal to occur, and a fast reactive inhibition
process when a signal is presented [39–41]. The p(respond) data
suggest an impairment in reactive inhibition. A closer inspection of
the reaction time data suggest that the subjects in all groups were
slower to respond in the second block of the experiment (Controls:
M = 516.85, SD = 133.74; PrG: M = 540.73, SD = 149.78; PG:
M = 522.07, SD = 91.50); compared with the first block of the
experiment (Controls: M = 481.00, SD = 119.39; PrG: M = 502.26,
SD = 124.02; PG: M = 504.18, SD = 92.41; block effect: F(1,99) =
36.039, p,.0001; group effect: F(2,98) = 0.33, p = .72; group6
block interaction: F(2,98) = 1.45, p = .24). Response slowing could
be a marker of proactive inhibition, but see also [41]. Therefore, this
finding suggests that there is no impairment in proactive inhibition
in pathological gamblers. However, the design was not optimized to
Figure 3. Mean of percent response inhibition at four stop-signal delays. PrG = problem gamblers; PG = pathological gamblers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050647.g003
Figure 4. Graphic representation of the proportion of correctly inhibited responses plotted, for each group (controls, PrG, PG), as a
function of (a.) stop-signal delay (50; 150; 250; 350); (b.) the difference between RT for non-stop trials and stop-signal delay.
PrG = problem gamblers; PG = pathological gamblers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050647.g004
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study proactive inhibition so future research is required to examine
this aspect of behavioral control.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate the relationship
between the severity of gambling dependence and two facets of
impulsivity: impulsive action and impulsive choice. Impulsive action was
assessed using a variant of the stop-signal task; impulsive choice
was estimated with the delay-discounting task. In comparison with
non-gamblers, non-treatment seeking excessive gamblers were
impaired on both impulsive action and impulsive choice, which is in line
with a number of studies that reported impaired pre-potent
inhibition performance [7,15–18] and higher rate of discounting
[19,26–28,42] in pathological gamblers (PG). Compared with non-
gamblers, problem gamblers (PrG) performed worse in the
impulsive choice task but not in the impulsive action task. Finally,
when we compared PG with PrG directly, we found that they
performed similarly in the impulsive choice task. By contrast, on
the impulsive action task, PG were less efficient than PrG.
Specifically, only PG showed impaired performance in the most
demanding condition of the stop-signal task (i.e, the 350 ms SSD
condition), that is to say, when the stop signal is presented close to
the moment of response execution, see race model by Logan and
Cowan [35]. When the stop signal delay was short and the
response was not prepared yet, PG and their controls performed
similarly. Thus, it is especially under conditions in which a
response is close to execution and a fast inhibition process is
required, that stopping seems to fail in pathological gamblers.
Importantly, all these effects remained after controlling for the
influence of a number of possible confounds (anxiety, depression,
ADHD and IQ level). Furthermore, our excessive gamblers groups
(problematic and pathological) are similar with respect to the
duration of gambling experience, which suggests that higher
impulsive action is a risk factor to become a pathological gambler. In
other terms, impulsive action has an impact on the severity of
abnormal gambling. By contrast, impulsive choice seems to act as
general risk factor for abnormal gambling, regardless of the level of
severity.
Results regarding the impact of impulsive action on the severity
of abnormal gambling are consistent with those of previous studies.
For instance, Odlaug and colleagues [18] recently found that PG
exhibited significant deficiencies in motor impulse control in the
stop-signal task compared with no-risk and at-risk gamblers.
Results showing that impulsive choice did not discriminate PrG
from PG are consistent with MacKillop and colleagues [28] who
highlighted higher rate of discounting in PG and PrG as compared
with recreational gamblers. Nevertheless, present results on
impulsive choice are also in apparent contradiction with findings
from two studies [26,27] that have highlighted a relation between
problem gambling severity and delay discounting. Reasons of the
discrepancy between these findings and present results could be
due to differences in sample characteristics. Indeed, participants
selected for Stea [27] study were mostly recreational or problem
(rather than pathological) gamblers. Participants recruited from
Alessi and Petry [26] were pathological gamblers enrolled in
gambling treatment centers, which contrasts greatly with our
sample, that is, gamblers not seeking any treatment. Moreover,
there is evidence that impulsive choice, as measured by the DDT,
is not static but changes following abstinence from addictive
behavior [43].
Collectively, the present results showed that pathological
gambling is associated with impulsive action and impulsive choice
whereas problem gambling is only associated with impulsive choice.
In other terms, these findings suggest that gamblers may manifest
impulsivity in fairly specific ways according to their degree of
gambling dependence severity. Results of our study are in line with
a research from Diergaarde and colleagues [25] in which impulsive
action and impulsive choice predict vulnerability to distinct stages of
nicotine seeking behavior in rats. Indeed, impulsive action was
primarily associated with higher level of nicotine self-administra-
tion whereas impulsive choice was related to an inability to inhibit
nicotine seeking during abstinence together with an enhanced
sensitivity to nicotine-associated cues. Based on this research, we
suggested that problem gambling would be related to an enhanced
reactivity towards gambling cues (impulsive choice) whereas patho-
logical gambling would be characterized by both enhanced
gambling cues reactivity (impulsive choice) and inability to disengage
from gambling behavior (impulsive action). In sum, the present
results further support the role of impaired impulsive action in severe
problem gambling behavior. The main implication of these
findings is that intervention strategies aimed at reducing gambling
should increase gambler’s capacity to disengage from gambling
cues or behavior.
A limitation of this study is that we did not recruit gamblers
enrolled in a gambling-related treatment program. The present
findings are also limited to casino gamblers. Therefore, our
conclusions may not apply to pathological gamblers involved in a
therapeutic treatment and might not generalize to gamblers with
other forms of gambling practices. Finally, we also didn’t recruit
non-problem gamblers as a control for gambling interest and
habit. Hence, ‘‘problem gambling’’ could not be isolated per se.
Thus, it is certainly important to extend this research to a larger
sample of gamblers, which has both extreme ends of the spectrum
of gambling dependence well represented.
Several strengths of the current study are also of note. This
research is the first that simultaneously examined the influence of
gambling dependence severity on both impulsive action and
impulsive choice. Second, the present study employed a three-
group design, with a comparison of two groups of gamblers that
differ according to the range of problems with gambling. This
allowed us to suggest that gamblers may manifest impulsivity in
fairly specific ways according to their degree of gambling
dependence severity. Third, this study explores impulsivity more
accurately by utilizing a task-based approach rather than self-
reported measures. Fourth, we recruited control participants with
very similar demographic features to gamblers, and the two
gamblers groups were also very similar.
To conclude, this study highlighted that impulsive action could
make the transition between regulated to compulsive gambling
faster whereas impulsive choice could act as general factor of more
elevated risk of excessive gambling. This is important because one
could expect that clinical interventions that aim to improve
impulse control, and especially impulsive action, might also help to
reduce susceptibility to gambling dependence and continued
gambling use, or, alternatively lead to successful gambling
cessation.
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33. Wechsler D (2000) WAIS-III. Échelle d’intelligence de Wechsler pour adultes,
Troisième édition. Paris: ECPA.
34. Groth-Marnat G (1997) Handbook of Psychological Assessment, 3rd edition.
New York: John Wiley & Sons.
35. Logan GD, Cowan WB (1984) On the ability to inhibit thought and action: A
theory of an act of control. Psychol Rev 91: 295–327.
36. Marsh DM, Dougherty DM, Mathias CW, Moeller FG, Hicks LR (2002)
Comparisons of women with high and low trait impulsivity using behavioral
models of response-disinhibition and reward-choice. Pers Indiv Diff 33: 1291–
1310.
37. Verbruggen F, Logan GD (2009) Models of response inhibition in the stop-signal
and the stop-change paradigms. Neurosci Biobehav R 33: 647–661.
38. Brevers D, Cleeremans A, Goudriaan AE, Bechara A, Kornreich C, et al. (2012)
Decision making under ambiguity but not under risk is related to problem
gambling severity. Psychiat Res 6: 234–340.
39. Aron AR (2011) From reactive to proactive and selective control: developing a
richer model for stopping inappropriate responses. Biol Psychiatry 69: 55–68.
40. Boulinguez P, Jaffard M, Granjon L, Benraiss A (2008) Warning signals induce
automatic EMG activations and proactive volitional inhibition: evidence from
analysis of error distribution in simple RT. J Neurophysiol 99: 1572–1578.
41. Verbruggen F, Logan GD (2009) Proactive adjustments of response strategies in
the stop-signal paradigm. J Exp Psychol Hum Perc Perf 35: 835–854.
42. Dixon MR, Holton B (2009) Altering the magnitude of delay discounting by
pathological gamblers. J Appl Behav Anal 42: 269–275.
43. Bickel WK, Odum AL, Madden GJ (1999) Impulsivity and cigarette smoking:
delay discounting in current, never, and ex-smokers. Psychopharmacology 146:
447–454.
Impulsive Choice and Action in Problem Gambling
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 November 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 11 | e50647
